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It is possible in principle to construct quantum mechanical observables and unitary operators
which, if implemented in physical systems as measurements and dynamical evolution, would con-
tradict the Church-Turing thesis, which lies at the foundation of computer science. Elsewhere we
have argued that the quantum measurement problem implies a finite, computational model of the
measurement and evolution of quantum states. If correct, this approach helps to identify the key
feature that can reconcile quantum mechanics with the Church-Turing thesis: finitude of the degree
of fine-graining of Hilbert space. This suggests that the Church-Turing thesis constrains the physical
universe and thereby it highlights a surprising connection between purely logical and algorithmic
considerations on the one hand and physical reality on the other.
PACS numbers: 02.10.Ab, 03.65.Ta
Quantum mechanical measurements on a physical system are represented by observables- Hermitian operators on
the state space of the observed system. It is an important question whether all observables and all unitary evolutions
may be realized, in principle on physical systems [1]. It turns out that ideas from computer science are crucial to
the analysis. The reason is that some problems that are classically considered uncomputable can sometimes be re-
cast as appropriate quantum observables or unitary operations, which, if phyiscally implementable, could apparently
render them computable. There has appeared to be no known principle that forbids the implementation of such
quantum mechanical observables or unitary dynamics. If feasible, they would imply that quantum mechanics not only
impacts computational complexity, in terms of speeding up certain computations [2], but also impacts computability.
In a remarkable work that founded modern computer science, Turing [3, 4] defined a class of functions now known
as recursive or computable functions. The Church-Turing thesis [5] of computer science states that these functions
correspond precisely to any effective or mechanical method for obtaining the values of a mathematical function. The
Church-Turing thesis is fundamental to theoretical computer science, since it asserts that the mathematical class of
functions studied by computer scientists, the computable functions, is the most general class of functions that may
be effectively calculated by any physical means. It is an empirical statement, not a mathematical theorem, that has
been verified over 65 years of testing [4, 6].
The present work reexamines the question of whether, accepting the Church-Turing thesis as an informal guiding
principle for physics [7], we can identify a principle that can reconcile this conflict between it and the general model of
computation that quantum mechanics seems to make possible. Naturally, for specific systems particular measurements
and unitary dynamics could be precluded by some system specific features, such as superselection rules. We will not
be concerned with such specific features, but rather with general considerations. In fact, we find that we cannot be
confined to the physical realm of measurement and dynamics, but are led to examine the algorithmic foundations of
physical processes, in the light of the computational model of quantum measurement [8].
For convenience, we refer to computable partial functions of a single non-negative integer as programs. The qual-
ification ‘partial’ signifies that there may be some input values for which the function is not defined. An example
of a program is the function f(x) = x3, which may be computed using a suitable mechanical procedure (a Turing
machine). On the other hand, an example of a function that does not stop or halt for some input, and is thus undefined
for that input, is f(x) ≡ “the smallest number that is the sum of x squares”, which will not halt on x = 4 [9].
The question of whether or not a given program, numbered p (according to any consistent enumeration scheme,
such as Go¨del numbering) halts on input i is obviously a question of considerable practical importance: we would
like to know whether a given algorithm will terminate or not. To understand this better, Turing defined the halting
function h(p, i) as some algorithm to decide whether program p halts on input i and demonstrated using a reductio
ad absurdum argument that the halting problem is not a decidable. A version of this argument is as follows. Suppose
we define the halting function by:
h(p, i) =
{
= 0 if p(i) loops endlessly,
= 1 otherwise,
(1)
and diagonal function r(n) by:
r(n) =
{
0 if h(n, n) = 0,
loops endlessly otherwise.
(2)
2Suppose r(n) is computable and this can be ascertained by running h(r, n). Yet, setting n = r above, we find
r(r) = 0 ⇔ h(r, r) = 0 ⇔ r(r) diverges, which is a clear contradiction. Thus, r(n) cannot be computable. Since
the computability of h(p, i) would imply that of r(n), it follows that the halting function is also noncomputable here.
This is related to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem that says that if a consistent axiomatic system is rich enough to be
self-referential, then it will be incomplete in that true but unprovable statements can be made in it [10].
It is reasonable to expect that quantum computation does not impact computability, since the latter appears to
follow mostly from logical considerations rather than any model of computation [11]. Moreover, one might expect that
noncomputability might be embedded right in the (classical) specification of the implementation of such otherwise
hypercomputational operations. A quantum algorithm can in principle side-step this contradiction, by distinguishing
quantum and classical algorithms. A quantum function qh(p, i), similar to Eq. (1), can conceivably exist to determine
whether the classical program will halt on input i or not. The above contradiction would be avoided if qh(p, i)
cannot take as argument the modified program r(n), which is now of quantum character because it calls qh(p, i) as
subroutine [12]. This follows from the fact that qh(p, i) can accept only integers (enumerations of programs, such as
Go¨del numbering), while quantum programs have to be labelled by real numbers, which have a larger cardinality than
integers. The idea is that the computer should not be powerful enough to compute its own diagonal function, which
if it is, leads to the above contradiction. However, this suggests that a quantum algorithm can in principle compute
the halting problem for Turing machines.
Let us consider Hilbert’s tenth problem, the Entscheidungsproblem (decision problem), which asks for a procedure
to decide whether a given Diophantine equation (polynomial with integer coefficients) D(x) has a solution in the
domain of natural numbers, i.e., x ≡ (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Nn. This is known to be Turing uncomputable [13]. However,
suppose we define a ‘Diophantine evolution’, UD, by:
UD ≡
∞∑
x=0
|D2(x), x〉〈x|, (3)
where {|x〉} is an orthonormal basis for the state space of some physical system with a countably infinite dimensional
state space. Here |D2(x), x〉 is a state with energy eigenvalue D2(x) ≡ (D(x))2. It is easy to verify that UD is unitary.
We note that UD is equivalent to measuring a ‘Diophantine observable’ Dˆ:
Dˆ ≡
∞∑
x=0
D2(x)|x〉〈x|, (4)
If one can design a Hamiltonian that effects UD, then the search for a solution to D(x) is equivalent to checking
whether the ground state of the Hamiltonian has energy Eg = 0. An exhaustive search can never terminate if no
solution exists, which is a manifestation of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem. However, in the quantum
case, if the required Hamiltonian can be prepared, and its ground state accessed in finite time, then a single check
suffices to decide whether D(x) has a solution [12]. It is clear that the success of the above method depends on
superposition in Fock space and the guarantee that the ground state minimizes energy. The power of the ground state
oracle derives from “energy tagging”, which appears to be more powerful than a usual quantum search oracle.
If we may abstract the computational model that this quantum procedure embodies, devoid of any physical content,
and idealize it, the result is what may be called an infinite Turing field T (ℵ0,ℵ0): the set of countably infinite (ℵ0)
Turing machines Tx simultaneously evaluating D(x), a total recursive function, on each possible value of x, having
infinite memory, and the power to communicate instantaneously with each other (i.e, message passing rate = ℵ0/sec),
such that the moment some Tx finds D(x) = 0 on its x, all Tx’s are brought to halt, and, deterministically, precisely
this value x and no other is printed out. The twin arguments of T (ℵ0,ℵ0) signify that it is composed of infinitely
many Turing machines that are able to talk to each other infinitely fast. In modern computer terminology, this is
akin to a computer having infinite RAM and infinite clockrate. Note that this is a well-defined model because the
set of all possible values of n-tuples x ∈ Nn has the same cardinality (ℵ0) as the set of natural numbers N. An
alternate definition of T (ℵ0,ℵ0) is that it is a Turing machine that performs calculations infinitely fast (i.e, at the
rate of ℵ0 logical operations per second, or ops). T (ℵ0,ℵ0) transcends the Turing barrier by performing infinite
calculations in finite time. Further, by stipulating that it accepts only problems of finite size, we ensure that it is not
powerful enough to compute its own diagonal function and thus remains logically consistent for our present needs.
The proposed quantum algorithms for computing Turing uncomputable functions [12, 14] are in effect emulating a
probablistic version of T (ℵ0,ℵ0), where the level of confidence can be made arbitrarily high as time increases. They
involve a countably infinite dimensional Hilbert space, where each dimension in the generic quantum superposition
corresponds to a Turing machine in the field T (ℵ0,ℵ0).
3A demonstration that a quantum computer, even probablistically, emulates T (ℵ0,ℵ0) would violate the Church-
Turing thesis, for it would demonstrate an effective algorithm to compute a function that is Turing uncomputable.
There is an implicit and quite reasonable assumption on which the Turing barrier transcendence attributed to quantum
algorithms rests: the presumed infinitude of the universe, in particular, of Hilbert space. However, the computational
model for quantum measurement (CMQM) [8] suggests that, insofar as the quantum state dynamics of physical
systems may be regarded as information registered and computations performed by the (quantum) universe, the latter
is equivalent to a finite Turing field: a finite number of Turing machines interlinked by finite speed message passing.
If true, then this furnishes a very basic algorthmic-physical principle why quantum computers cannot break through
the Turing barrier. What is the evidence for this principle? In Ref. [8], we argue that the quantum measurement
problem is the required evidence.
A simple recapitulation of the measurement problem is as follows. Suppose we have a spinor prepared in the
state |+〉x = (1/
√
2)(|+〉z + |−〉z) and a macroscopic meter that measures the observable σˆz. The meter has three
macroscopic states, given by {|+〉M , |−〉M , |0〉M}. If the spinor exists in one of the σˆz eigenstates, the meter gives a
measurement according to the interaction: |±〉z|0〉M −→ |±〉z|±〉M . Yet, when the state |+〉x is measured, this does
not lead to a superposition according to |+〉x|0〉M −→ (1/
√
2)(|+〉z |+〉M + |−〉z |−〉M ), as the principle of linearity
suggests, but probablisitically to one of the outcomes |±〉z|±〉M . The absence of macroscopic superpositions, that one
would naturally expect during measurement via system-apparatus entanglement, is the measurement problem.
In CMQM, the dynamical evolution of physical systems are modeled as computational acts on an abstract, finite,
algorithmic structure underlying physical reality. The apparent break-down in linearity noted above and the meso-
scopic threshold at which it presumably occurs are related to a finite degree of fine-graining of the Hilbert space of
physical systems (in general, of the universe). The fine-graining parameter µ (in bits per amplitude; µ/2 bits each
specifying the real and the imaginary part) specifies the precision to which states, and their unitary evolution, can
be specified in principle. According the ‘principle of computational resolution’ enunciated in the model, µ should
be large enough to support a uniform superposition. That is, in a system of n qubits, each amplitude in a uniform
superposition
∑
2
n−1
j=0 λj |j〉 is given by |λj | = 2−n/2, which should be greater than 2−µ/2, so that (roughly) n ≤ µ.
If a system, through entanglement engendered by interaction with its environment, becomes larger than is this, i.e.,
the dimension of its Hilbert space exceeds 2µ, the system is said to become computationaly unstable because the
computational and mnemonic support for its physical evolution is overwhelmed, and to discontinuously suffers an
information transition to a separable state chosen probablistically. Such transitions in the abstract memory registers
are identified with the ‘state vector reduction’ or ‘collapse of the wavefunction’. Subsequent interaction again drives
the exponential enlargement of the system’s state space via entanglement with its environment. The continual cycle
of alternating dynamical evolutions and information transitions is responsible for the appearance of classicality at
the macro-level, which is described by the Lindblad equation [15]. Therefore, µ determines the Heisenberg cut, the
mesoscopic threshold that presumably separates the quantum microcosm from the classical macrocosm. If no such cut
existed, CMQM implies that macroscopic superpositions would be ubiquitous, which they aren’t (for comments on
the important role of decoherence, cf. [8]). In short, in this light we infer that the classicality of the macroscopic world
implies a finite computational and memory support of the universe for the evolution of physical systems, equivalent
to a finite Turing field T (M,V ), where M,V < ℵ0.
In the case where the large dimension arises from accessible excited states, rather than from interactions, the finite
value of µ implies an upper bound to number of basis states that can be evolved coherently in a superposition, given
by about 2µ, because amplitudes that are in principle magnitudinally much smaller than 2−µ/2 will be re-set to zero,
with concommitant loss of information from the state. If the number of ‘important’ superposed states is sufficiently
small, which is the situation in most cases, this truncation effect is hardly signifcant. However, when the evolution
passes through intermediary states where amplitude can be spread out among a large number of states, approaching
the above bound, the deviation from unitary evolution can be significant. The apparent behaviour of the system will
be one whose unitary evolution is interrupted because of decoherence or of having been measured. In a complicated
energy landscape of states, the system can collapse into a local minimum. The evolution would no longer be given by
an equation of the form Eq. (3), but of a more general positive operator that leads to a final state that is mixed.
We can use observations to bound M and V from above. If S represents the entropy of an isolated system, then
CMQM implies (roughly) that the memory corresponding to it (ie., the total information required to specify its
microstate in Hµ, the finitely fine-grained Hilbert space) is about M ≡ eS/kBµ and total speed of computation that
corresponds to sustaining the evolution of the system is about V = 2µ/2eS/kBE/~ ops, where E is energy of the system.
Suppose for instance that the largest object whose unitary evolution (run at µ bit precision) can be stably supported
by the universe is an Avogradro number of qubits, beyond which the system becomes computationally unstable and
hence classical. Then µ can be estimated to be about 1023 bits, from which one can estimate M ≈ 210231023 ≈ 21023
bits and V ≈ 21.5×1023E/~ ≈ 21.5×1023 ops (for more realistic estimates, cf. Ref. [8]). Not surprisingly, the memory
4overhead and the computational speed of all conventional computers combined is far lesser. With about 109 computers
equipped with terabit memory and operating at a clock rate of about 109 Hz performing about 105 elementary logical
operations per clock cycle, all the human-made computers in the world can store 1021 ≪ M bits, and are operating
at no more than 1023 ≪ V ops.
If the evolution of the universe is equivalent to a finite algorithmic procedure, then it is clearly subject to the
limitations of a Turing machine, even though it is much more powerful and faster than any conventional computer
that can be created. In particular, the finitude of µ means that all possible quantum programs that correspond to
physical reality, including qh(p, i) and r(n), can be enumerated at that digital precision. The contradiction that
arose in Eq. (1) can no longer be avoided, and we recover the Church-Turing thesis. Similarly, according to the
computational resolution principle, a superposition of more than 2µ states cannot be coherently maintained without
interruptions to its unitary evolution. In practice this means that Diophantine equations with possible solutions larger
than 210
23
are effectively uncomputable using UD in Eq. (3). Suppose all the degrees of freedom in the universe were
available for storing information: this can be estimated to be about 10120 bits, including gravitational degrees of
freedom [16]. Even if we grant µ = 10120 so that coherent evolution of the universe as a whole can be computationally
supported, CMQM implies that the number of Tx’s in a finite Turing field equivalent to the quantum algorithm cannot
exceed 210
120
; in an arbitrary basis, the number of elements in UD in Eq. (3) cannot exceed 2
10
120×210120 . This seems
quite unlikely even as the system is ‘rotated’ over vast tracts of states, corresponding to various potential solutions
to D(x). Accordingly, the possible largest solutions to a non-recursive function (such as the solution to an arbitrary
Diophantine equation) that can be explored are bounded above by 210
120
. One might say that there is not enough
room in the resolution limited Hilbert space Hµ of any quantum computer to explore all of the solution space, which
is Nn.
The point can be further clarified in taking a spin 1
2
system. Consider
Ω ≡
∑
p halts
2−|p|, (5)
Chaitin’s constant, which is the probability that an arbitrary program will halt, where |p| is the size (in bits) of
program p [17]. Knowing the binary expansion of Ω is equivalent to solving the halting problem for all p. If the
universe, and thence the Hilbert space that describes it, are infinite, one might consider an effective method of
designing the evolution UC ≡ exp(−iΩσx). Applying the dynamics UC on a system prepared in the | ↑〉z state (spin
up in the z direction) results in the state:
cos(Ω)| ↑〉z + sin(Ω)| ↓〉z . (6)
By repeatedly performing this procedure and measuring σz , we may determine cosΩ and thus Ω to any desired
accuracy, with arbitrarily high confidence. According to the computational model, however, cosΩ can never be
known with precision greater than µ. Although µ can be arbitrarily large, and thus in principle Ω calculated in
principle to arbitrary precision, in any given instance of the universe, µ is finite and thus Ω can never truely be
computed.
This work has discussed whether the observables and dynamics permitted by quantum mechanics permit quantum
computation to transcend the Turing barrier that bounds computable functions. If they do, they would in principle
contradict the Church-Turing thesis. Using concepts from computer science and in the framework of CMQM, we
resolve this conflict by pointing out that the measurement problem implies that a quantum computer corresponds to
a finite Turing field. This viewpoint, which is based on a realistic interpretation of the state vector as a not entirely
accessible object that resides and evolves in an abstract space, is referred to as ‘informational realism’. It is perhaps
the simplest and most direct interpretation of the basic mathematical formalism. Its physical content shows up only
when the large but finite upper bound it imposes on the dimension of coherently evolving systems is reached.
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